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We provide empirical estimates of the risk-sharing and 
redistributive properties of the German federal fiscal system based on data 
from 1970 until 2006, with special attention to the effects of German 
unification. We find that tax revenue sharing between the states and the 
federal government and the fiscal equalization mechanism 
(Länderfinanzausgleich) together reduce differences in per-capita state 
incomes by 37 percent during period 1970 to 1994. After the full 
integration of East German states into the mechanism in 1995, the 
redistributive effects increase slightly to about 39 percent. With respect to 
the insurance effect of the German fiscal system, our results indicate that 
the federal fiscal system offsets 47 percent of an asymmetric shock to state 
per-capita incomes. This effect has significantly decreased after the 
inclusion of the East German states in 1995. Furthermore, we find that the 
German fiscal system provides almost perfect insurance for state 
government budgets against asymmetric revenue shocks; also, its 
redistributive effect with regard to the tax resources available to state 
governments is very strong. 
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1  Introduction 
The traditional theory of fiscal federalism (Oates, 1972) regards the payment of 
intergovernmental grants within a federation as an instrument to address the inefficiencies 
arising from inter-jurisdictional fiscal spillovers and to reduce inequalities in the supply of 
public goods across regions with different tax capacities and levels of income. More recent 
literature has pointed out that, in a world with imperfect capital markets, fiscal arrangements for 
risk sharing and redistribution of income across the states of a federation can play an important 
role for consumption smoothing (Boadway 2004; Bucovetsky 1998; Lockwood 1999). Such 
arrangements have received considerable interest in recent years, both in the context of 
designing the fiscal framework of the European Monetary Union (EMU) and in the design of 
new federal systems in developing countries (Boadway and Shah, 2007). One branch of this 
literature considers the role of such arrangements for redistribution and consumption 
risk-sharing among consumers living in different regions of a country or federation, which are 
exposed to region-specific shocks (e.g., Atkeson and Bayoumi, 1993; Wildasin, 1996; Persson 
and Tabellini, 1996a, 1996b; Bucovetsky 1998; Lockwood, 1999, Boadway, 2004). The other 
branch of the literature starts with Mundell’s (1961) analysis of optimum currency areas. 
Following Kenen (1969), it argues that, in a world of sticky wages and prices, fiscal transfer 
arrangements among regions or states sharing the same currency can stabilize regional aggregate 
demand and employment by redistributing income between regions exposed to asymmetric 
cyclical shocks (European Commission, 1977a, 1977b; Sachs and Sala-i-Martin, 1992; von 
Hagen, 1992; Goodhart and Smith, 1993; Bayoumi and Masson, 1995; Athanasoulis and van 
Wincoop, 1998). This literature has played an important role in the design of EMU and its main 
point is nicely summarized by the former president of the European Commission, Jacques 
Delors (see Delors, 1989, p.89), in the blueprint for the EMU:  
  “... in all federations, the different combinations of federal budgetary 
mechanisms have powerful “shock-absorber” effects dampening the amplitude either 
of economic difficulties or of surges in prosperity of individual states. This is both the 
product of, and the source of the sense of national solidarity which all relevant 
economic and monetary unions share.”  
The empirical work in this area has focused on the extent to which fiscal flows between 
different regions or between the regions and the central government offset regional differences 
in economic fluctuations at cyclical frequencies. Most of it has analyzed the US fiscal system. 
Sachs and Sala-i-Martin (1992) estimate that the tax and transfer flows between the US federal 
government and the states offset between 33 and 40 percent of a region-specific shock and, thus, 




distinguishing between the (short-term) stabilization and (long-term) redistribution functions of 
federal fiscal systems, which Sachs and Sala-i-Martin neglected.
3 Later studies in this area 
adopted this distinction, and their empirical results commonly suggest that the contribution of 
the US fiscal system to stabilizing regional incomes is much smaller than what Sachs and 
Sala-i-Martin estimated, ranging between 10 and 30 percent. At the same time, the redistributive 
effects are large.
4 Empirical studies for other countries, including Canada, France, Italy, report 
similar results.
5 
This paper provides new evidence on the stabilization and redistributive properties of 
the federal fiscal system in Germany. Germany is a particularly interesting case in this context, 
because, like Canada and unlike the United States, it has an explicit, constitutional, and 
formula-based mechanism for fiscal equalization, which redistributes tax revenues among the 
states and the federal  government. Yet, empirical evidence on properties of the German federal 
fiscal system with regard to consumption smoothing remains scant. This is most likely due to the 
intricacies of the rules of the system, data problems and the structural breaks connected with 
German unification in the early 1990s.
6  
To facilitate comparison with the results for other countries in the literature mentioned 
above, we follow the methodological approach of earlier studies. Our paper makes two 
contributions to the literature with regard to consumption smoothing and income redistribution. 
First, it provides an analysis of the stabilizing and redistributive properties with regard to state 
disposable income at all stages of fiscal equalization. This allows us to show the contributions of 
the different vertical (“federal-to-state”) and horizontal (“state-to-state”) transfers. Second, our 
analysis covers the pre-unification period, during which only the ten West German states 
participated in the system, and the post-unification period, which extended the system to the five 
East German states and the city state of Berlin. It thus provides evidence for the effects of 
unification on fiscal equalization in Germany.
7  
                                                 
3 In this paper, we use the terms stabilization and insurance interchangeably. 
4 See Goodhart and Smith, 1993; Bayoumi and Masson, 1995; Mélitz and Zumer, 1998, 2002, van 
Wincoop (1995), and Kletzer and von Hagen (2001) for a detailed review of this literature. 
5 With regard to Canada, however, Smart (2004) points out that, due to lags in the calculation of the  
equalization grants, fiscal equalization may actually be destabilizing.  
6 Pisani-Ferry et al. (1993) study the stabilizing properties of German fiscal equalization, and they do so 
based on a methodological approach which is very different from the rest of the literature. They find that the fiscal 
system stabilizes between 34 and 42 percent of asymmetric shocks affecting individual states. 
7 Fiscal equalization is not the only mechanism of regional income redistribution in Germany. Federal 
health insurance, unemployment insurance and pension systems also provide powerful mechanisms for the same 
purpose. Several empirical studies have taken a broader perspective of the issue and analyzed the stabilizing 
properties of the fiscal system as a whole for the regions of Germany. Using the methodology suggested by 
Asdrubali et al. (1996), Büttner (2002) finds that, during the period from 1970 to 1997, the entire German fiscal 




Brennan and Buchanan (1980, chapter 9) analyze federal fiscal constitutions from a 
political economy perspective based on the assumption that politicians maximize the budgets 
they have available for public spending. They argue that intergovernmental transfers serve to 
suppress fiscal competition, which is the very purpose of federalism in their view, and, therefore, 
lead to inefficient outcomes.
8  Intergovernmental transfers help stabilize tax cartels among 
subcentral governments. Furthermore, the direction and size of intergovernmental transfers 
become  functions of the political bargaining power of individual state governments. 
Specifically, Brennan and Buchanan predict that small states and relatively poor states in terms 
of tax capacity benefit most from such arrangements.
9 This view of fiscal equalization as a 
barrier against fiscal competition has played an important role in recent debates over fiscal 
federalism in Germany, where the large degree of redistribution of tax revenues among state 
governments strongly reduces the incentives for governments to attract potential tax payers and 
foster economic growth through good economic policies (e.g., Homburg, 1994; Peffekoven, 
1994, 2001; Huber and Lichtblau, 2000; Lenk, 2000).  
While the principle of fiscal equalization is grounded in the German constitution, the 
particular mechanism used for this purpose and its frequent changes over time have been 
regulated by federal legislation negotiated between federal and state governments. They are, 
therefore, the outcome of intergovernmental negotiations, in which the representatives of the 
regional and the federal governments fought over the distribution of tax revenues (Renzsch, 
1989, 1991; Rothweiler, 1972; Selmer, 1994).
10  Several empirical studies have recently 
                                                                                                                                                          
mechanism contributes 6.8 percent to this. Of the remainder, about 5 percent of income smoothing comes from the 
federal unemployment insurance, and around 4.3 percent from the federal mandatory pension system. In a paper 
that focuses on the risk sharing properties of Germany’s federal unemployment insurance with respect to regional 
labor income, Kurz’s (2000) empirical investigation leads to a very similar result. In her study, about 8 percent of a 
shock to regional labor income is smoothed by the federal unemployment insurance. Additionally, she finds that 
unemployment insurance has only a small effect on long-term redistribution of regional labor incomes. He does not 
consider the effects of German unification. Kellermann (2001) uses German data from the same time period and 
distinguishes explicitly between pre- and post-unification data. The sample from 1970 to 1990 (“pre-unification”) 
includes only the 10 states of the former West Germany; the sample from 1992 to 1997 (“post-unification”) includes 
all 16 states of the unified Germany. Based on the same methodology as Asdrubali et al. (1996), she finds that public 
transfers smooth over 40 percent of shocks to state income. More recently, Jüßen (2006) investigates risk sharing 
and redistribution in post-reunification Germany based on a very disaggregated data set of 271 labor market regions. 
He finds that the German fiscal system provides no insurance against asymmetric income shocks over and above 
what is provided by private capital markets. Furthermore, the fiscal system turns out to be very effective in 
decreasing long-term differences in regional incomes leading to convergence of regional incomes towards the 
national average. Jüßen’s data, however, cannot identify the effects of fiscal equalization. 
8 In contrast, Boadway (1992), among others argues that intergovernmental grants can help mitigate the 
adverse effects of excessive competition among local governments that would lead to races to the bottom in the 
provision of public goods.  
9 Pitlik (2004) provides a formal exposition of this argument based on the Baron and Ferejohn (1989) 
model of legislative bargaining.  
10 Thus, Selmer (1994, p. 343) writes: “The reform of fiscal equalization presents itself as an attempt, 
questionable in many respects, to embed the compromise regarding the contributions of the federal and the state 




considered the distributional effects of fiscal equalization in terms of state tax revenues ( Lenk 
2004; Lenk and Birke, 2000; Pitlik 2004, Pitlik and Schmid 2000; Pitlik et al. 2001, 2006). These 
papers analyze the gains and losses states obtain due to fiscal equalization in per-capita or 
relative terms and show that they can be explained in terms of the bargaining power individual 
states have in the legislative process. More specifically, states which are relatively 
overrepresented in the upper house of Germany’s parliament benefit the most from fiscal 
equalization, while states which are relatively underrepresented contribute the most to it. 
Our paper adds to this strand of literature in several ways. First, we analyse the 
redistributive properties of fiscal equalization based on relative state tax revenues rather than 
absolute or relative gains from equalization. This gives a more direct representation of the 
redistributive properties of the system.  
Second, we take the concept of fiscal federalism as an insurance mechanism and apply 
it to the political economy approach. Assume that state government representatives are risk 
averse. They care not only about the size but also about the stability of their budgets over time. 
They may then regard fiscal equalization not only as an instrument for redistribution but also for  
insuring state government revenues against idiosynchratic shocks. Bargaining over the design of 
a system of fiscal federalism then involves a trade-off between redistribution and insurance, 
which should be accounted for in the empirical assessment. In view of this, we analyze the 
stabilization properties of equalization with regard to state tax revenues, an aspect which has 
been neglected in the literature so far.  
Our main results can be summarized as follows. With regard to consumption smoothing 
and income redistribution, we find, first, that the German federal fiscal system provides 
considerable redistribution of disposable per-capita income between states. It reduces 
pre-equalization differences in state disposable incomes by about 37 percent. This is comparable 
in magnitude to other federations. Most of it is achieved through tax sharing between the states 
and the federal government. Second, until 1994, the German federal fiscal system offset about 
47 percent of asymmetric shocks to state incomes and thus provided significant stabilization. 
Again, most of this was achieved through tax sharing with the federal government, while 
equalization through horizontal transfers among the states offset only about 10 percent of 
asymmetric shocks to state disposable incomes. Since the inclusion of the new East German 
states in the system, the insurance effect has declined to about 19 percent. While large and small 
                                                                                                                                                          
November 11-13, 1993, into the formal framework for redistribution given by the existing fiscal constituion of Art. 
106-107 of the German constitution.” (our translation). See e.g. Persson and Tabellini (1996a,b) for a formal 
analysis of the difference between intergovernmental grants negotiated at the constitutional stage and grants 




states did not benefit from the stabilizing function before 1995, city states enjoyed almost perfect 
stabilization of their disposable incomes. After 1995, the overall stabilizing function has 
decreased, but all states now benefit from it independently of their size. Third, while German 
unification has left the overall degree of redistribution unchanged, it has  changed the 
contributions of the different stages of the system and, significantly, it has led to more 
redistribution among the West German states.  
With regard to state tax revenues, we find, fourth, that the German federal fiscal system 
provides for significantly more redistribution of state tax revenues than of state disposable 
incomes, reducing pre-equalization differences by about 75 percent on average. Finally, we find 
that the system provides (almost) perfect insurance of state tax revenues against asymmetric 
shocks.  
  The rest of this paper proceeds as follows. In section 2, we explain the design of the 
federal fiscal system in Germany. Section 3 presents the data and provides some descriptive 
statistics. In section 4, we present our empirical methodology and our main empirical results. 
Section 5 concludes. 
2  The Federal Fiscal System in Germany 
2.1. Institutional Design and Developments 
Germany is a federation of 16 states, of which 10 together with West-Berlin formed the 
Federal Republic of Germany from 1949 to 1990. Five East German states became additional 
members in 1990, and the (now united) city of Berlin also became a state at that time.
11 
The country’s federal fiscal system is an attempt to reconcile two conflicting principles 
which are present in the German constitution (Renzsch, 1991). On the one hand, the state 
governments are autonomous and independent of each other and of the federal government in 
their budgetary policies, and they are individually responsible for carrying out their tasks 
effectively.
12 On the other hand, the German constitution requires the states to assure “uniform 
living standards throughout the territory of the federation”.
13 With regard to tax revenues, the 
constitution mandates the federation to assure that all state governments have the financial 
means to supply their citizens with public goods and services of similar quantity and quality.
14 
The tension between these two principles arises from the large differences in the economic 
strength and, hence, the tax capacity of the individual states. These differences call for transfers 
                                                 
11 For a list of states, see table 9. West-Berlin had a special status in pre-unification Germany and was 
not part of the fiscal equalization mechanism during that time period.  
12 Grundgesetz (German Constitution) Articles 29, 30, and 109:1. 
13 Grundgesetz, Article 72:2, Para 3, and Artikel 106:3, Para 2. 




among the states to achieve a greater degree of equality. In addition, the federal government can 
pay transfers to individual states in order to improve their fiscal conditions.  
All taxes in Germany are collected by the states. This is a consequence of the fact that 
the federal government does not have its own administration to execute its policies; the German 
constitution mandates the states to execute all federal policies as their own concerns. All major 
taxes are legislated by federal law and the state governments participate in the legislative 
procedure through the Upper House of the German parliament (Bundesrat), the members of 
which are representatives of the state governments, not elected by the citizens. As a result, 
individual state governments cannot change the parameters of the main taxes and there is no tax 
competition among states.
15 Tax legislation including the assignment of revenues to the federal 
and state level is part of a broader process of political negotiations and trades between the federal 
and the state governments (Pitlik et al, 2001; Renzsch, 1991; Selmer, 1994).  
Germany’s Constitution of 1949 assigned the revenue of all taxes of unambiguous local 
incidence to the states, among them personal and corporate income taxes and business taxes, 
leaving the federal government only with the revenue from a sales tax, which was later replaced 
by a value-added tax (VAT), and some minor taxes. In order to secure it with a sufficient revenue 
base, the federal government initially received a third of the revenues from personal and 
corporate income taxes collected by the states; this share gradually climbed to 35 percent until 
1969, with the states receiving a share of the revenues from VAT in return. Personal and 
corporate income taxes and VAT are called Gemeinschaftsteuern (shared taxes).  
The 1949 Constitution called for subsequent federal legislation to regulate the sharing 
of revenues among the states and the federal government. This was achieved by the Fiscal 
Constitution Act (Finanzverfassungsgesetz) of 23 December 1955. It instituted a horizontal tax 
revenue sharing arrangement among the states (Länderfinanzausgleich) covering the revenues 
from all state taxes plus half of the local taxes accruing to the municipalities. The Act guaranteed 
every state a minimum of 88.75 percent of the national average per-capita revenue from this base 
from 1956 onwards. By 1959, this minimum had been raised to 91 percent. In 1967, the federal 
government started paying supplementary transfers (Bundesergänzungszuweisungen) to states 
with low tax capacities to further even out the remaining discrepancies. 
The federal fiscal system was reformed in 1969. Half of the revenue from corporate 
income tax, 42.5 percent of the revenue from personal income tax, and 70 percent of the revenue 
from VAT were assigned to the federal government. The horizontal tax revenue sharing 
arrangement was changed to guarantee each state a minimum of 95 percent of the national 
                                                 




average per-capita revenues from all state taxes and half of the revenue from local taxes. Over 
the next two decades, the federal share of personal and corporate income taxes remained 
virtually unchanged, but the federal share of VAT was adjusted numerous times and fluctuated 
between 70 percent in 1970 and 65 percent in 1990. After German unification in 1990, it fell to  
63 percent by 1994.  
German unification required another reform of the federal fiscal system to 
accommodate the large gap in tax capacities and per-capita incomes between the new East 
German and the incumbent West German states (Selmer, 1994). Between 1990 and 1994, 
transfers to East Germany were managed by the federal government while the financial relations 
between the latter and the West German states continued on the basis of the existing framework. 
A new federal fiscal framework was negotiated between the states and the federal government 
during this period. This was deemed necessary because a simple integration of the new states 
into the existing framework would have turned all West German states into net contributors, a 
prospect which was unacceptable for those that were net recipients previously. Thus, the 
negotiations of the new framework focused on the question how the transfers from West to East 
Germany would be shared between the federal government and the states. The new system, 
which took effect in 1995, fully integrated the East German states. It entailed a significant 
change in the formula for distributing VAT income. The federal share of VAT revenue dropped 
from 63 percent in 1994 to 56 percent in 1995, and then to 50.5 percent in 1996 and 1997, the 
remainder going to the state governments. Since 1998, local governments also receive a share of 
around two percent of VAT revenue taken from the states’ share. In more recent years, the 
federal share has stabilized at around 53 percent and the state governments’ share at around 45 
percent. 
Subsequently, we refer to Länderfinanzausgleich (LFA) as fiscal equalization.  It is a 
formula-based mechanism and comes after the splitting of the revenues from shared taxes 
between the federal government and the states. Note that the latter already involves considerable 
redistribution of revenues among the states, since the incidence of shared taxes is very different 
across states. LFA itself is a three-stage process. At the first stage, the states’ share of total 
national VAT revenues is redistributed among the states. 75 percent of the total VAT revenues 
attributed to the states are distributed among the states on an equal per-capita basis. The 
remaining 25 percent of the total VAT revenues are transferred to states with initial per-capita 
tax revenues from all state taxes of less than 92 percent of the federal average.
16 If the amount 
available for redistribution is not large enough, the transfers are scaled back proportionally. If 
                                                 
16 The tax revenues considered at this stage include all pure state taxes as well as a state’s share of 




the amount available is more than what is needed, the remainder is distributed among the 
financially strong states on a per-capita basis.  
At the second stage of LFA, tax capacities and resource needs are calculated for all 
states. Tax capacity is determined by the sum of state tax revenues
17 and 50 percent of the local 
taxes collected on a state’s territory. Resource needs are calculated as the average per-capita 
state tax revenues in Germany multiplied by the population of the respective state.
18 The 
difference between tax capacity and resource needs determines whether a state pays or receives 
additional, horizontal transfers under LFA. Financially weak states receive payments lifting 
them to at least 92 percent of federal average per-capita tax revenues. If a state’s revenues are 
between 92 and 100 percent of the federal per capita average, it receives transfers that amount to 
37.5 percent of that difference. Until 1995, states with revenues exceeding 102 percent of the 
national average paid contributions to LFA. For per-capita revenues between 102 and 110 
percent of the federal average, the contribution was equal to 70 percent of the difference; for 
per-capita revenues above 110 percent of the federal average, the contribution was 100 percent 
of the difference between the state’s revenues and the federal average. As a result, the 
differences in per-capita tax revenues among the states after redistribution ranged between 95 
percent and 104.4 percent of the federal average.  
The 1995 reform of LFA modified these rules. For per-capita revenues between 100 
and 101 percent of the national average, the contribution is now 15 percent of the difference, for 
per- capita revenues between 101 and 110 percent of the federal average, it is 66 percent of the 
difference, and for per-capita revenues above 110 per cent of the federal average, it is 80 percent 
of the difference. Contributing states must be left with at least 95 percent of the average 
per-capita revenues after redistribution. Together with the supplementary payments, all states 
have at least 99.5 percent of the average per capita revenues. 
At the third stage of LFA, the federal government makes payments to the states to 
further reduce the differences in per-capita tax revenues. These “supplementary transfers” are 
general-purpose grants which are computed on the basis of special financial needs and the per 
capita VAT revenue of the financially weak states. Before 1995, the total volume of these grants 
was capped at two percent of total VAT revenues. The 1995 reform lifted this cap and greatly 
increased the role of these payments in order to provide the East German states with sufficient 
fiscal resources (Dickertmann and Gelbhaar, 1996; Pitlik and Schmid, 2000; Selmer, 1994). 
Furthermore, it introduced a number of new supplementary grants targeting smaller West 
                                                 
17This sum now includes the VAT revenue assigned to a state in the first stage. 
18At this stage, the special financial needs of the city states Hamburg and Bremen (and later Berlin) are 




German states, all East German states, as well as the West German states Bremen and Saarland, 
which were facing difficulties with the transition from the old equalization system.
19 In 2000, 11 
of the 16 states received supplementary grants suggesting that they respond more to political 
bargains between states and the federal government than purely distributional concerns, which, 
in principle, could be addressed at the earlier stages of the system (Selmer, 1994). The 
discretionary nature of these new vertical grants has reduced the transparency that previously 
characterized German fiscal equalization (Guihéry, 2001). 
In 1998, the states of Baden-Württemberg, Bavaria, and Hesse, all three net 
contributors to LFA, challenged the federal fiscal system before Germany’s Constitutional Court. 
In its 1999 ruling, the court demanded another reform of the system, which took effect in 2005. 
The reform changed the definition of tax capacity to include 64 percent of municipal taxes and 
the transfer and contribution rates to strengthen the incentives for state governments to improve 
the tax capacity of their states. Based on a simulation model for 2005, Lenk (2004) argues that 
the main effect of this reform was a strengthening of the financial position of the states at the cost 
of the federal government.   
To summarize, the federal fiscal system in Germany involves the following steps: (1) 
Splitting of tax revenues from shared taxes between the federal and state governments; (2) LFA, 
which has three stages, (2A) horizontal redistribution of VAT revenues, (2B) horizontal 
equalization payments, and (2C), vertical supplementary transfers from the federal to state 
governments. 
 
2.2. Empirical Hypotheses 
The purpose of this paper is to provide an empirical assessment of fiscal equalization in 
Germany. We consider two aspects of the system, the traditional view of equalization as an 
instriument for income redistribution and regional income insurance, and the political-economy 
view that regards equalization as an instrument for state government representatives to obtain 
larger and more stable budgets. 
Regarding the traditional view, our empirical hypotheses are straightforward: 
Equalization should reduce income differences among states and reduce income fluctuations 
around a common mean income. 
Regarding the political-economy view, ecent empirical studies for Germany (Lenk 
2004; Pitlik 2004, Pitlik and Schmid 2000; Pitlik et al. 2001, 2006) have shown that the gains 
and losses states obtain due to the federal fiscal system can be explained by arguments drawn 
                                                 




from political economy as suggested by Brennan and Buchanan. The first argument is that states 
coming into the system with relatively weak tax revenues should benefit the most, because, in 
the negotiations over the rules of equalization, they have the least to lose and, therefore, do not 
have to make large concessions to other states.  In line with this, these studies find that the gains 
states obtain through the system are strongly negatively correlated with their pre-equalization 
tax revenues. One should note, however, that the same correlation pattern would also obtain if 
the federal fiscal system objectively aimed at reducing inequalities in the states’ disposable 
revenues per capita.  
The second argument starts from the observation that states are not equally represented 
in the Bundesrat, the Upper House of the German parliament, which must agree on any changes 
in the rules of the system. Specifically, large states have a much smaller number of seats per 
citizen in the upper house than small states and the small states can outvote the larger ones.
20 In 
legislative decisions concerning fiscal federalism in the Upper House, small states are attractive 
candidates for winning coalitions, because they bring relatively many votes. Furthermore, 
smaller states tend to be fiscally weak compared to larger ones. As explained by Pitlik (2004), 
one should, therefore, expect small states to favor stronger redistribution of tax revenues and, 
due to their strong relative bargaining power, one should also expect these states to gain more 
from the federal fiscal system than large states. This hypothesis is confirmed in terms of absolute 
transfer amounts by Pitlik (2004) and Pitlik et al (2001, 2006).  
In this paper, we carry this reasoning further in three respects. First, German unification 
has increased the number of small and financially relatively weak states. By doing so, it has 
increased the bargaining power  of the small and relatively weak West German states in the 
Upper House. In view of this, our hypothesis is that these states are among the winners of the 
reform of the federal fiscal system that occurred in 1995. 
Second, while the studies mentioned above only consider the redistributive effects of 
the entire system, our analysis allows us to look at the effects of the various stages of the system. 
This is interesting, because the nature of the political negotiations changes from the perspective 
of the states. Splitting the revenues from joint taxes with the federal government (step one of the 
process) is a non-zero sum game, where the states as a group can benefit at the cost of the federal 
government and states may be willing to accept more redistribution among themselves for the 
benefit of obtaining a larger share of the revenues from these taxes jointly. In contrast, the 
horizontal revenue sharing at stages 2A and 2B is a zero-sum game for the states where 
redistribution may be more difficult to agree on. Finally, if, as argued by the literature, federal 
                                                 




supplementary grants mainly respond to political bargains between individual states and the 
federal government, we expect equity concerns regarding the distribution of revenues the states 
to play a minor role at best at stage 2C. This suggests that redistribution is strongest at the stage 
of revenue splitting, followed by stages 2A and 2B and weakest at stage 2C. 
Third, if state governments value the prospect of getting insurance of their tax revenues 
against asymmetric shocks from the federal fiscal system, there may be a trade-off between 
redistribution and insurance of tax revenues in the negotiations over the rules of fiscal federalism. 
This opens up the possibility that states make larger concessions in terms of redistribution for the 
benefit of obtaining more insurance. This implies that, in order to show that small and fiscally 
weak states can exploit their bargaining power, it is not enough to show that they obtain larger 
net transfers in the federal system, because this could also be the outcome of a trade of more 
redistribution for more insurance for the larger states. Therefore, we hypothesize that the larger 
states did not get more tax revenue insurance in return for agreeing to more redistribution in 
favor of the smaller states.  
3  Data and Descriptive Statistics 
In this section, we provide a more detailed description of the variables used in the panel 
data analysis to estimate the amount of risk sharing and redistribution provided by German fiscal 
equalization. We construct two different data sets: The first consists of annual data of the 10 
West German states from 1970 to 1994. Comparable data do not exist for East Germany, and the 
German Democratic Republic was not organized as a federal system. The second data set 
contains annual data of all 16 German states covering the period from 1995 to 2006. Both panels 
are balanced. We follow previous literature and construct state income by adding up net state 
income at factor prices and all tax revenues with incidence in the state. These tax revenues 
include all federal (Bundessteuern), state (Landessteuern), and local taxes (Gemeindesteuern), 
plus the taxes shared between all three levels of government (Gemeinschaftsteuern). 
We use four different versions of state disposable income corresponding to the four 
stages of the German federal fiscal system included in our paper. The first includes state income 
(as defined above) minus all federal taxes, the federal share of the shared taxes, and the federal 
share of the local business tax (Gewerbesteuerumlage). The result is the sum of net state income 
at factor prices plus all state and local taxes that remain with either the state or the state’s local 
governments. The law on LFA governs the next two steps in the redistribution of tax revenue. In 
the first step, VAT revenues are redistributed among the states. The second definition of state 
disposable income thus includes VAT transfers received (+) or paid (–) from or to other states. In 




third definition of state disposable income adds or subtracts transfers from the second definition. 
Finally, the forth definition of disposable income includes any additional federal grants paid to a 
state (Bundesergänzungszuweisungen). 
For the period from 1970 to 1994, we use national accounting data provided to us by the 
Statistical Office of Baden-Württemberg. Data on tax revenues before and after redistribution 
come from publications of the German Federal Statistical Office (Statistisches Bundesamt 1977, 
1989, 2000). Very detailed tax data on the local, state, and federal level for the years 1991 to 
1994 were provided by the Statistical Office of Baden-Württemberg. Data on VAT 
redistribution and state-to-state transfers are provided in the annual publications of the Upper 
House of Parliament (Bundesrat, various years). All nominal variables for this sample period are 
deflated with the West German GDP deflator with base year 1991. 
For the period from 1995 to 2006, we use national accounting data provided online by 
the German federal and state statistical offices (Statistisches Landesamt Baden-Württemberg, 
2008) which is based on a standardized European Union methodology (ESVG1995). Note that, 
because of the change in accounting methods, the data for the two sub-periods are not directly 
comparable. Very detailed tax data on the local, state, and federal level for the years 1995 to 
2002 is provided by the Statistical Office of Baden-Württemberg; data for the years 2003 to 
2006 is available online from the German Federal Statistical Office (Statistisches Bundesamt, 
various years). Again, data on VAT redistribution and state-to-state transfers is published 
annually by the Upper House of Parliament (Bundesrat, various years). All data for the period 
from 1995 to 2006 is deflated by state-specific GDP deflators with base year 1991.  
Table 1 reports some basic statistics for West Germany and the sample period from 
1970 to 1994.  In 1970, real GDP per capita among the 10 West German states ranged from 82 to 
171 percent of the federal average, with the standard deviation amounting to around 16 percent 
of the federal average. Over the next two and a half decades, the range narrowed slightly from 83 
to 167 percent of the average. The standard deviation from the average remains virtually 
unchanged with 15 percent of average per capita real GDP. It is noteworthy that per-capita VAT 
transfers and state-to-state transfer receipts did not change significantly as a percentage of 
average GDP over time. State-to-state transfer payments even fall both in absolute value and as a 
percentage of GDP. However, federal transfers noticeably went up (in both absolute value and as 
a percentage of GDP), particularly after German unification. 
[Table 1 about here] 
 
In Table 2, we report these same basic statistics for the data set from 1995 to 2006, 




poorest and richest states appears to be narrowing over time. Not unexpectedly, transfer 
payments – especially from VAT revenue – increased significantly compared to the earlier time 
period as a result of including the much poorer East German states in the fiscal equalization 
mechanism. 
 
[Table 2 about here] 
 
Tables 3 and 4 present the same statistics for the East and West German states separately 
during the period 1995 to 2006. The tables show, first, the marked economic heterogeneity 
across these two groups. Average net state income per capita in 2006 was about 78 percent larger 
in West Germany than in East Germany. This gap widened over the 12 years under consideration. 
In 2006, the largest per-capita GDP in an East German state was still considerably smaller than 
the smallest per-capita GDP in a West German state. Tax capacity, measured as average tax 
revenue per capita is about 160 percent larger in West Germany than in East Germany. Second, 
the tables show that East German states are net receivers in LFA with average per-capita 
horizontal transfers increasing from 229 to 271 euros. Average per-capita horizontal payments 
in West Germany increase from 70 to 78 euros over the same period. At the same time, average 
per-capita federal grants to East German states increased from 416 to 603 euros, while federal 
grants paid to West German states fell from 48 to a mere 10 euros. 
4 Redistribution and Stabilization   
4.1.  Methodology 
The literature of the 1990s has used a variety of empirical approaches to estimating and 
stabilization and redistributive properties of fiscal federal systems. In an important contribution, 
Mélitz and Zumer (2002) review this literature and develop a canonical model, which 
encompasses the earlier approaches and facilitates comparison across different studies. We 
apply their approach to Germany. Let Xit be the ratio of per-capita state income in state i at time 
t and the national average per-capita income at time t. Furthermore, let Yit be the ratio of 
per-capita state disposable income in state i at time t and the national average disposable income 
per capita. For our purposes, Xit refers to state income before and Yit to state income after the 
application of the different stages of the federal fiscal system. Let variables without time indices, 
Xi and Yi, denote the sample period averages, Mélitz and Zumer start from the following 
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In equation (1), eit is a stochastic disturbance. The coefficient βd describes the effect of 
a change in the relative long-run average state income on the relative long-run average state 
disposable income. A coefficient of βd=1 implies no redistribution at all, while βd =0 implies 
“full redistribution” as a change in relative state income does not affect state disposable income. 
Thus, (1- βd) gives the degree of redistribution achieved by the stage of fiscal equalization under 
consideration. Furthermore, the coefficient βs relates deviations of relative state income at time t 
from the relative long-run average state income to deviations of relative state disposable income 
from its relative long-run average and describes the stabilization aspect of the federal fiscal 
system. Again, (1-βs) indicates the degree of stabilization provided by the fiscal system. Mélitz 
and Zumer decompose equation (1) into two parts to illustrate this point:  
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where vi and uit are random disturbance terms. Equations (2) and (3) define the two 
regressions we use below to determine the degrees of redistribution and stabilization achieved 
by fiscal equalization in Germany. Note that equation (2) uses the cross section only. This might 
be a problem, if the state economies had grown with very different trend growth rates during the 
sample period, which, however, was not the case. We estimate equation (2) by OLS and equation 
(3) using a panel estimator with robust standard errors to correct for heteroskedasticity and serial 
correlation of the errors. To check for robustness, we also estimated equation (3) with time fixed 
effects that would pick up any relevant effects at the aggregate level such as the country-wide 
business cycle or political events such as federal elections. Since the time fixed effects did not 
change the results, we do not report these estimates below.  
4.2  Results for State Income 
4.2.1. Redistribution 
Table 5A presents the results of estimating equation (2), where 1-βd corresponds to the 
degree of redistribution. The table reports the standard errors of the estimates together with an 
indication of statistical significance. Note that the latter refers to the Null of βd = 0 or (1- βd) = 1. 
For the time period from 1970 to 1994, we find that the degree of redistribution 
provided by Germany’s federal fiscal system ranges from 31.4 to 36.9 percent, depending on 




joint taxes with  the federal government. It reduces differences in per-capita state disposable 
income by 31.4 percent. This is less than von Hagen’s (1992) result for the US of 47 percent, but 
in the same range as Mélitz and Zumer’s (2002) and Bayoumi and Masson’s (1995) results for 
Canada. The redistributive effect of the horizontal VAT redistribution and state-to-state transfers 
together is only 5.2 percent, coming mainly from the redistribution of VAT revenue. The 
contribution to redistribution of vertical transfers from the federal government to states is 
negligibly small. 
After the inclusion of the East German states in LFA in 1995, the degree of 
redistribution at the stage of tax sharing with the federal government falls to 25 percent, while 
the contribution of VAT redistribution increases to 9.4 percent. Overall, transfers among the 
states have become much more important as an instrument for income redistribution after 1995. 
Vertical federal grants now contribute about 2.6 percent of redistribution.   
In table 5B, we repeat the regressions for the later period, but we now ask to what extent 
the federal fiscal system leads to redistribution of income among the West and the East German 
states separately. We do this by using East and West German averages, respectively, as reference 
levels for state income instead of the national average. The table shows two interesting features. 
First, both the transfer of the federal tax share and the redistribution of VAT revenues have 
become significantly more redistributive among the West German states compared to the earlier 
time period. Overall, the federal fiscal system now eliminates 63 percent of the differences in 
per-capita incomes among West German states compared to 37 percent before 1995. Thus, the 
relatively poor West German states have benefitted greatly from the inclusion of the East 
German states into the system. Second, the degree of redistribution is much lower among the 
East German states. Overall, it is less than half the degree of redistribution among West German 
states and about two thirds of the degree of redistribution achieved at the national level. 
State-to-state transfers even increase income inequality slightly among East German states, and 
federal grants do not contribute much to redistribution at all. Thus, after 1995, the federal fiscal 
system is more effective in closing the income gap between East and West German states than 
the gap among East German states.
21 
 
[Tables 5A and 5B about here] 
                                                 
21 To check the robustness of our results with respect to the fiscal system’s reform of 2005, we also split 
the post-1994 sample into subsamples 1995 to 2004 and 2005 to 2006 for both the state disposable income and the 
state tax revenue redistribution regressions. In both cases, the results do not change significantly and coefficients 




4.2.2  Stabilization  
Next, we turn to estimating equation (3). Our results are presented in tables 6A and 6B. 
We pool our data for the German, West German, and East German samples, but we also 
distinguish stabilization effects by state size.
22 Let us first focus on our pooled samples in table 
6A. In the period from 1970 to 1994, the cumulative degree of stabilization is 46.7 percent. Of 
the components of the fiscal equalization mechanism, the contribution of the horizontal transfers 
is around 10 percent. While the redistribution of VAT revenue contributes 3.3 percent of 
stabilization, horizontal transfer payments between states contribute the largest part with 6.9 
percent. Federal grants to states play the smallest role with 1.7 percent. 
 
[Table 6A about here] 
 
For the period from 1995 to 2006, the stabilization properties of the federal fiscal 
system decrease considerably to 19.4 percent, but the difference is not large enough to be 
statistically significant. The decline is due entirely to the smaller effect of tax revenue sharing 
between the states and the federal government. In contrast, the contribution of horizontal 
transfers and the effect of supplementary federal grants remain about the same.  
In columns 3 to 5 and 8 to 10 of table 6A, we separate the German states into large 
states, small states, and city states. We ask to what extent the stabilization properties are 
different for states of different size. Conventional macro economics would argue that 
stabilization is more important for city and small states, since their economies tend to be more 
specialized and, hence, more exposed to sector-specific shocks than the economies of large 
states. The table reports the stabilization effect for large states’ incomes (“large”) and the 
additional stabilization effects for small (“small”) and city states (“city”). The negative 
coefficients indicate that, before 1995, the federal fiscal system had a small but statistically 
significant destabilizing effect on state incomes of large states. This was mainly due to the 
transfer of the federal government’s share of tax revenues (– 9.8 percent). In contrast, LFA had a 
small stabilizing effect, so that the overall effect was reduced to around negative 6.7 percent. 
The results for city states differ strongly: state incomes are almost completely stabilized by the 
fiscal system. The coefficients for small states point in the same direction. However, the 
differences to the large states’ coefficients are not statistically significant. 
After 1995, tax sharing with the federal government has a small stabilizing effect on 
state income for large states. Together with the later stages of equalization, the entire system 
                                                 




now has a statistically significant albeit small stabilizing effect of around 17 percent for the large 
states. Note that the definition of an asymmetric shock here is relative to the average income for 
all of Germany rather than for West Germany alone. There is no significant stabilization 
advantage for city states any more.  In table 6B, we perform similar exercises using the West and 
East Germany sub-samples separately for the period since 1995.  The results for the pooled data 
for West Germany show that the stabilizing effect of the fiscal system (31.1 percent) is lower 
than in the pre-unification period. The largest contribution comes from tax revenue sharing 
between the federal government and West German states (16.2 percent), followed by VAT 
redistribution, which has a stabilizing effect of about 11.4 percent. Distinguishing the effects 
according to state size reveals that  city states are much better protected against asymmetric 
shocks than large and small states.   
For East Germany, we distinguish between so-called area states (Brandenburg, 
Mecklenburg-Vorpommern, Saxony-Anhalt, Saxony, and Thuringia) and the city state of Berlin. 
As table 6B shows, the stabilizing effect of the fiscal system for Berlin is indistinguishable from 
that for the other states. Overall, about 15 percent of asymmetric shocks are smoothed. Tax 
sharing with the federal government has a small, stabilizing effect on state income (around 5 
percent). LFA delivers the larger contribution with about 10 percent. 
In sum, our results suggest that the federal fiscal system provides much less insurance 
against asymmetric shocks to state disposable incomes since 1995 compared to the earlier 
period. 
 
[Table 6B about here] 
 
4.3. Results for State Tax Revenues 
4.3.1. Redistribution  
In this section, we consider the properties of Germany’s federal fiscal system in a 
different dimension. Rather than asking to what extent it leads to a redistribution and insurance 
of per-capita disposable incomes, we ask to what extent it serves to redistribute and insure per- 
capita state government revenues. While the previous sections have focused on the importance 
of the system for consumers living in the different states of Germany, we now focus on the role it 
plays for governments. The methodology remains the same with the exception that “income” 
now refers to state government tax revenues. Recall that our concept of tax revenues is more 
comprehensive than the revenues considered for the purposes of fiscal equalization in Germany. 
Thus, in the regressions below, we are not just reproducing the formulas applied at the various 




Tables 7A and 7B show the results for redistribution of state tax revenues. Before 1995, 
almost 60 percent of all revenue differences were eliminated at the stage of sharing tax revenues 
with the federal government. VAT redistribution adds another 15 percent; state-to-state transfers 
3.5 percent. Federal grants, however, increased revenue inequality among the states by about 7 
percent. Overall, the redistribution effect exceeds 70 percent.  
From 1995 onwards, tax sharing and LFA are almost equally effective. Tax sharing 
eliminates 40.7 percent of income differences, while VAT redistribution adds 32.2 percent and 
state-to-state transfers add 4.5 percent. Federal grants contribute virtually nothing to the 
redistribution of tax revenues. Overall, the system has become slightly more redistributive than 
before. Our results indicate that fiscal equalization plays a much more significant role for 
redistributing tax revenues among governments than for redistributing income among citizens. 
 
[Table 7A about here] 
 
In table 7B we look at the redistributive properties of the federal fiscal system among 
West and East German states separately after 1995. We find that the overall redistributive effects 
of the fiscal system are quite large in both subsamples (West: 89.2 percent; East: 67.8 percent), 
but smaller for East Germany. Tax sharing with the federal government has very different effects 
on both subgroups; but tax sharing and VAT redistribution taken together eliminate more than 
75 percent of the differences in state tax revenues. However, state-to-state transfers have 
opposite effects on state tax revenues in West and East Germany. They add about two percent to 
the redistribution effect in the West, but increase inequality in tax revenues in the East by about 
15 percent. Overall, the degree of redistribution among West German states has increased by 
about 18 percent compared to the pre-unification period. This is due entirely to the effect of 
federal grants at the last stage of LFA. As in the case of state disposable incomes, this indicates 
that the relatively poor state governments in West Germany have benefitted significantly from 
the 1995 reform of the federal fiscal system. 
Among the East German states, tax sharing with the federal government has only a 
small redistributive effect. VAT transfers eliminate 65 percent of differences in per-capita state 
tax revenues, but horizontal transfers increase revenue inequality. Federal grants compensate 
part of that latter effect. Overall, fiscal equalization eliminates about 68 percent of the 
differences in per capita tax revenues among East German state governments. This is less than 
the corresponding effect among West German states.  
 






Tables 8A and 8B show our results for insurance against asymmetric shocks to state tax 
revenues.  
 
[Table 8A about here] 
 
In the pooled data , before 1995, tax sharing with the federal government absorbed 63 
percent of all asymmetric shocks to state tax revenues among the West German states. The 
subsequent stages of fiscal equalization add more insurance, and the system including federal 
grants provides perfect insurance against such shocks. Distinguishing by state size reveals that 
tax sharing absorbed about 28 percent of asymmetric shocks in large and small states, but almost 
70 percent in city states. At the later stages of fiscal equalization, the overall effect for small and 
city states increases to almost perfect insurance. 
After 1995, the federal fiscal system has become somewhat less effective in insuring 
state tax revenues, although the difference is not statistically significant. The entire system still 
absorbs a remarkable 87 percent of asymmetric shocks to state tax revenues. Tax sharing with 
the federal government provides about 40 percent of the insurance, and VAT redistribution 
provides an additional 44 percent. Horizontal state-to-state transfers contribute about 10 percent. 
Federal grants now weaken the insurance effect by about 7 percent. When we control for state 
size, our results  suggest that, except for the last stage, city states receive more insurance than 
large and small states. 
Finally, we again split our sample into East and West German states and investigate the 
stabilization properties of the fiscal system for these subsamples separately (table 8B).  
 
[Table 8B about here] 
 
For West Germany, the overall fiscal system absorbs about 89 percent of asymmetric 
shocks to tax revenues, with the largest contribution coming from VAT redistribution with about 
45 percent. Federal grants are again slightly destabilizing. When we distinguish by state size 
(columns 2 to 4 in the table), it turns out that tax sharing is stabilizing for all states with about 20 
percent. Including VAT redistribution, stabilization increases to about 43 percent for small and 
large states, and to about 87 percent for city states. After state-to-state transfers, city states’ tax 
revenues remain significantly better insured than those of large and small states (large and small: 




insurance effect remain similar over time. Thus, after 1995, large and small states receive less 
insurance against asymmetric revenue shocks than city states in West Germany. 
For East Germany, the results are less conclusive. In the pooled data, tax sharing with 
the federal government together with the first two stages of LFA provides almost perfect 
insurance against asymmetric tax revenue shocks. However, federal grants at the last stage of 
LFA have a destabilizing effect and reduce the insurance effect to 69.2 percent. The distinction 
between small states and the city state of Berlin suggests that the fiscal system may provide less 
insurance for Berlin than for the other five East German states, but the effects are not statistically 
significant. Also, federal grants seem to have a much more destabilizing effect on Berlin than on 
the other states. But again, the effect is not statistically significant. 
5  Conclusion 
Our analysis explores the redistributive and stabilizing properties of the federal fiscal 
system in Germany, using data from 1970 to 2006. The system features a formula-based 
mechanism redistributing tax revenues between the states and the federal government and 
among the states. It is an outflow of the constitutional mandate to secure equal living conditions 
for all citizens in the country. To the best of our knowledge, ours is the first study analyzing both 
the stabilization and redistributive properties of the fiscal system of pre-unification Germany. It 
is also the first study directly comparing the effectiveness of the German fiscal system pre- and 
post-unification.  
We find that the federal fiscal system achieves a significant degree of redistribution of 
income and of stabilization of asymmetric shocks to state incomes in Germany. Most of this is 
achieved by the sharing of tax revenues between the states and the federal government at the first 
stage of equalization. However, the system is much more effective in eliminating differences in 
state tax revenues and in shielding state budgets from the impact of asymmetric revenue shocks. 
This suggests that the politicians who negotiated fiscal equalization since the beginning of the 
Federal Republic cared more about its implications for state governments than for private 
households in their regions. Future research should address the question to what extent this focus 
on state budgets rather than household incomes distorts the welfare effects of fiscal equalization. 
Another important question is, what incentive effects a system creates that eliminates all 
differences in per-capita revenues across state governments and completely shields budgets 
against the effects of state-specific economic shocks.  
Furthermore, we find that the redistributive effect of the federal fiscal system has 
slightly increased since the inclusion of the East German states, and that it equalizes incomes 




relatively poor West German states are among the winners of the reforms of fiscal equalization 
that came into effect in 1995. Obviously, German unification has not only led to large fiscal 
transfers from the Western to the Eastern part of the country. It has also increased transfers 
among the West German states. There is also a slight decline in the degree of insurance against 
asymmetric shocks to state tax revenues provided to large West German states, while the degree 
of insurance provided to small and city states remains the same. A suggestive interpretation is 
that, in the negotiations between the federal and state governments of that reform, the political 
representatives of the relatively poor West German states managed to forge a successful 
coalition with the representatives of the East German states. This is consistent with the 
observation that all relatively poor West German states fall into the categories of small and city 
states (see table 9) and that the bargaining power of these states in the Upper House of 
Germany’s parliament (Bundesrat) is larger than that of the large West German states (Pitlik et 
al., 2001). Table 9 illustrates this point by reporting the number of seats the individual states 
have in the Bundesrat. Of the total of 67 seats, 23 are for East German states, 18 for the West 
German states that are typically net receivers in LFA (Bremen, Lower Saxony, 
Rhineland-Palatinate, Saarland, and Schleswig-Holstein), and the remaining 26 belong to the 
West German states that are typically net contributors (Baden-Württemberg, Bavaria, Hamburg, 
Hesse, and North-Rhine Westfalia.)  
Recent research on the stabilizing functions of fiscal equalization was stimulated by the 
creation of a monetary union in Europe. A common argument in the debate over EMU has been 
that the monetary union needs a mechanism for paying transfers between member states in 
different stages of the business cycle. Our empirical results suggest that the stabilization of state 
disposable incomes provided by the horizontal transfers among the states of Germany is rather 
limited. Most of the stabilization achieved by fiscal equalization in Germany comes from 
transferring tax revenues from the states to the federal government. Since Europe does not have 
a government of a size comparable to today’s national governments, that is hardly an option for 
EMU. Germany’s example suggests that horizontal fiscal equalization alone is not a promising 
alternative, and may not be a politically viable option in any case. Since, in the case of the EU, 
fiscal equalization would necessarily be negotiated among the governments of the member states, 
the German example also warns that the outcomes of such negotiations may serve the interests of 







Asdrubali, Pierfederico, Bent E. Sorensen, and Oved Yosha (1996), “Channels of Interstate 
Risk Sharing: United States 1963-1990,” Quarterly Journal of Economics 111(4), 
1081–1110. 
Asdrubali, Pierfederico, and Soyoung Kim (2005), “Dynamic Risk Sharing in the United 
States and Europe,” Journal of Monetary Economics 51, 809–836. 
Athanasoulis, Stefano G., and Eric van Wincoop (2001), “Risk Sharing Within The United 
States: What Do Financial Markets and Fiscal Federalism Accomplish?,” The Review of 
Economics and Statistics, 83 (4), 688–698. 
Atkeson, Andrew, and Tamim Bayoumi (1993), “Do Private Capital Markets Insure Regional 
Risk? Evidence from the United States and Europe,” Open Economies Review 4, 303–324. 
Baron, David P. and John Ferejohn (1989), “Bargaining in Legislatures.” American Political 
Science Review 83, 1181-1206  
Bayoumi, Tamim, and Paul R. Masson (1995), “Fiscal Flows in the United States and Canada: 
Lessons for Monetary Union in Europe,” European Economic Review 39, 253–274. 
Becker, Sascha, and Mathias Hoffmann (2006), “Intra- and International Risk-Sharing in the 
Short and Long Run,” European Economic Review 50, 777–806. 
Boadway, Robin W. (1992), The Constitutional Division of Powers: An Economic Perspective. 
Ottawa 
Boadway, Robin (2004), “The Theory and Practice of Equalization.” CESifo Economic Studies 
50:1, 211-54. 
Boadway, Robin, and Anwar A. Shah (2007), Intergovernmental Fiscal Transfers: Principles 
and Practice. Washington DC: The World Bank. 
Brennan, Geoffrey, and James M. Buchanan (1980), The Power to Tax: Analytical 
Foundations of a Fiscal Constitution. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press 
Bucovetsky, Sam (1998), “Federalism, Equalization, and Risk Aversion,” Journal of Public 
Economics, 67 (3), 301–328. 
Bundesrat,  Zweite Verordnung zur Durchführung des Finanzausgleichsgesetzes im 
Ausgleichsjahr ...., Drucksache, various years. 
Büttner, Thiess (1999), “Regional Stabilization by Fiscal Equalization? Theoretical 
Considerations and Empirical Evidence from Germany,” ZEW Mannheim, mimeo. 
Büttner, Thiess (2002), “Fiscal Federalism and Interstate Risk Sharing: Empirical Evidence 
from Germany,” Economics Letters 74, 195–202. 
Delors, Jacques, (1989), “Regional Implications of Economic and Monetary Integration,” in 
Committee for the Study of Economic and Monetary Union, eds., Report on Economic and 
Monetary Union in the European Community, Luxembourg: Office for Official 
Publications of the EU. 
Dickertmann, Dietrich, and Siegfried Gelbhaar (1996), “Finanzverfassung und 
Finanzausgleich: Darstellung und Kritik des Finanzausgleichs in Deutschland.” Das 
Wirtschaftsstudium 25, 486-497  
European Commission (1977a), “Report of the Study Group on the Role of Public Finance in 
European Integration, Vol.1,” Studies: Economic and Financial Series A13, Brussels. 
European Commission (1977b), “Report of the Study Group on the Role of Public Finance in 
European Integration, Vol.2,” Studies: Economic and Financial Series B13, Brussels. 
Goodhart, Charles E.A. and Stephen Smith (1993), “Stabilisation,” in “The Economics of 
Community Public Finance” European Economy Reports and Studies 5, European 
Commission, 417–455. 
Guihéry, Laurent, (2001), “An Economic Assessment of German Fiscal Equalization Schemes 





Homburg, Stefan (1994), “Anreizwirkungen des deutschen Finanzausgleichs.” Finanzarchiv N. 
F. 51, 312-330 
Huber, Bernd, and Karl Lichtblau (2000), “A Tax on Tax Revenue. The Incentive Effects of 
Equalizing Transfers. Evidence from Germany.” CESifo Working Paper 333, Munich  
Jung, Adrian (2008), Maßstäbegerechtigkeit im Länderfinanzausgleich. Berlin: Duncker & 
Humblot. 
Jüßen, Falko (2006), “Interregional Risk Sharing And Fiscal Redistribution in Unified 
Germany,” Papers in Regional Science, 85 (2), 235–255. 
Kellermann, Kersten (2001), “Stabilization Properties of Interregional Fiscal Flows: Evidence 
for Germany, 1970-1997,” University of Fribourg, Center of Public Finance, mimeo. 
Kenen, Peter B. (1969), “The Theory of Optimum Currency Areas: An Eclectic View.” in: 
Robert Mundell and Alexander Swoboda (eds.), Monetary Problems of the World Economy. 
Chicago: University of Chicago Press. 
Kletzer, Kenneth, and Jürgen von Hagen (2001), „Monetary Union and Fiscal 
Federalism.“ In: Charles Wyplosz (ed.), The Impact of EMU on Europe and the Developing 
World. Oxford: Oxford University Press. 
Kurz, Claudia (2000), “Regional Risk Sharing and Redistribution by the Unemployment 
Insurance System: The Case of Germany,” Europa-Universität Viadrina, mimeo. 
Lenk, Thomas (2004), “Mehr Wettbewerb im bundesstaatlichen Finanzausgleich?” Jahrbücher 
für Nationalökonomie und Statistik 222:3, 351-378 
Lenk, Thomas, and Anja Birke (2000), “Solidarpakt-II-verhandlungen im Lichte des Urteils 
des Bundesverfassungsgerichts zum Länderfinanzausgleich vom 11. November 1999.” 
Arbeitspapier Nr. 14, Universität Leipzig Institut für Finanzen, Finanzwissenschaft 
Lockwood, Ben (1999), “Inter-Regional Insurance.” Journal of Public Economics 72, 1-37. 
Mélitz, Jacques and Frédéric Zumer (1998), “Regional Redistribution and Stabilization by 
the Centre in Canada, France, the United Kingdom and the United States: New Estimates 
based on Panel Data Econometrics,” CEPR Discussion Paper 1829. 
Mélitz, Jacques and Frederic Zumer (2002), “Regional Redistribution and Stabilization by 
the Center in Canada, France, the UK and the US: A Reassessment and New Tests,” Journal 
of Public Economics, 86 (2), 263–286. 
Mueller, Dennis C. (2003), Public Choice III. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press 
Mundell, Robert (1961), “A Theory of Optimum Currency Areas,” American Economic 
Review, 51 (4), 657–665. 
Oates, Wallace E. (1972), Fiscal Federalism. New York 
Peffekoven, Rolf (1994), “Reform des Finanzausgleichs – eine vertane Chance.” Finanzarchiv 
N. F. 51, 281-311 
Peffekoven, Rolf (2001), “Reform des Länderfinanzausgleichs und des Solidarpakts II.” 
Wirtschaftsdienst 81, 427-434 
Persson, Torsten and Guido Tabellini (1996a), “Risk Sharing and Moral Hazard,” 
Econometrica, 64 (3), 623–646. 
Persson, Torsten, and Guido Tabellini (1996b), “Risk Sharing and Redistribution,” Journal of 
Political Economy, 104 (5), 979–1009. 
Pisani-Ferry, Jean, Alexander Italianer, and Roland Lescure (1993), “Stabilization 
Properties of Budgetary Systems: A Simulation Analysis,” in “The Economics of 
Community Public Finance” European Economy Reports and Studies 5, European 
Commission, 511–538. 
Pitlik, Hans (2004), “Zur politischen Rationalität der Finanzausgleichsreform in Deutschland.” 
Hohenheimer Diskussionsbeiträge 239, Stuttgart: Universität Hohenheim  
Pitlik, Hans, and Günther Schmid (2000), “Zur politischen Ökonomie der föderalen 
Finanzbeziehungen in Deutschland.” Zeitschrift für Wirtschaftspolitik 49:1, 100-124 
Pitlik, Hans, Günther Schmid, and Harald Strotmann (2001), ”Bargaining Power of Smaller 




Pitlik, Hans, Friedrich Schneider, and Harald Strotmann (2006), Legislative 
Malapportionment and the Politicization of Germany’s Intergovernmental Transfer System.” 
Public Finance Review 34, 637-662 
Renzsch, Wolfgang (1989), “German Federalism in Historical Perspective: Federalism as a 
Substitute for a National State.” Publius: The Journal of Federalism 19, 17-33. 
Renzsch, Wolfgang (1991), Finanzverfassung und Finanzausgleich: Die Auseinandersetzung 
um ihre politische Gestaltung in der Bundesrepublik Deutschland zwischen 
Währungsreform und deutscher Vereinigung (1948-1990).. Bonn: Dietz. 
Rothweiler, Robert L. (1972), “Revenue sharing in the Federal Republic of Germany.” Publius: 
The Journal of Federalism 1, 4-25. 
RP-Online (2009), “NRW wird zum Nehmerland.” www.rp-online.de, 6 February 2009  
Sachs, Jeffrey, and Xavier Sala-í-Martin (1992), “Fiscal Federalism and Optimum Currency 
Areas: Evidence for Europe from the United States,” in Vittorio Grilli, Matthew Canzoneri 
and Paul Masson (eds.), Establishing a Central Bank: Issues in Europe and Lessons from 
the US, London, UK: Cambridge University Press, 195–219. 
Selmer, Peter (1994), “Die gesetzliche Neuordnung der bundesstaatlichen Finanzbeziehungen.” 
Finanzarchiv N. F. 51, 351-357 
Sorensen, Bent E., and Oved Yosha (1997) “Federal Insurance of US States: An Empirical 
Investigation,” in Assaf Razin and Efraim Sadka (eds.), Globalization: Public Economics 
Policy Perspectives, Cambridge: Cambridge University Press. 
Smart, Michael (2004), “Equalization and Stabilization.” Canadian Public Policy – Analyse de 
Politiques 30, 195-208. 
Spahn, Paul Bernhard (2000), “On the Controversy of Fiscal Equalization in Germany.” 
Working Paper 13245, Munich Personal RePEc Archive, 
http://mpra.ub.uni-muenchen.de/13245 
Statistisches Bundesamt, Fachserie 14, Finanzen und Steuern, Reihe 4.S.1, Kassenmässige 
Steuereinnahmen, 1967 bis 1976, W. Kohlhammer Verlag Stuttgart und Mainz, 1977. 
Statistisches Bundesamt, Fachserie 14, Finanzen und Steuern, Reihe 4.S.1, Kassenmässige 
Steuereinnahmen, 1977 bis 1987, Metzler-Poeschel Verlag Stuttgart, 1989. 
Statistisches Bundesamt, Fachserie 14, Finanzen und Steuern, Reihe 4.S.1, Kassenmässige 
Steuereinnahmen, 1988 bis 1999, Metzler-Poeschel Verlag Stuttgart, 2000. 
Statistisches Bundesamt,  Fachserie 14, Finanzen und Steuern, Reihe 4, Steuerhaushalt, 
Metzler-Poeschel Verlag Stuttgart, various years. 
Statistisches Landesamt Baden-Württemberg,  Arbeitskreis Volkswirtschaftliche 
Gesamtrechnungen der Länder, Berechnungstand 1998, electronic copy, 1998. 
Statistisches Landesamt Baden-Württemberg,  Arbeitskreis Volkswirtschaftliche 
Gesamtrechnungen der Länder, Berechnungstand 1998, available online at 
http://www.vgrdl.de/Arbeitskreis_VGR/home.asp. 
van Wincoop, Eric (1995), “Regional Risksharing,” European Economic Review 39, 
1545–1568. 
von Hagen, Jürgen (1992) “Fiscal Arrangements in a Monetary Union - Some Evidence From 
the US,” in Don Fair and Christian de Boissieux (eds.), Fiscal Policy, Taxes, and the 
Financial System in an Increasingly Integrated Europe, Deventer: Kluwer Academic 
Publishers, 337–359. 
von Hagen, Jürgen (2000), “Fiscal Policy and Intranational Risksharing.” In: Gregory C. Hess 
and Eric van Wincoop (eds.), Intranational Macroeconomics. Cambridge: Cambridge 
University Press  
von Hagen, Jürgen (2007), “Achieving Economic Stabilization by Risk Sharing Within 
Countries.” In: Boadway and Shah (2007). 
Wildasin, David E. (1996), “Introduction: Fiscal Aspects of Evolving Federations”, 
International Tax and Public Finance 3(2), pp. 121-135, May. 






Table 1: Basic Statistics 1970-1994. 
 
  
Year  Variable  Average Std. Dev. Minimum Maximum
  
1970  Gross Domestic  Product  12,942 2,044 10,674 22,174
  Net national income  10,177 1,550 8,228 16,983
  Total tax revenue  2,930 1,496 1,997 10,735
  VAT transfer  -3.71 117.44 -502.43 184.34
  State-to-state transfers  0.00 63.28 -204.22 152.91
  Federal grants  1.98 2.75 0.00 7.57
  
1980  Gross  Domestic Product  16,711 2,418 14,222 28,444
  Net national income  12,892 1,799 10,892 20,902
  Total tax revenue  4,166 1,825 2,746 14,200
  VAT transfer  -6.46 152.47 -784.65 143.11
  State-to-state transfers  0.00 69.95 -136.42 186.09
  Federal grants  16.01 21.32 0.00 55.93
  
1990  Gross Domestic Product  20,300 3,083 16,876 33,441
  Net national income  15,694 2,461 13,055 25,468
  Total tax revenue  4,530 1,771 2,802 13,533
  VAT transfer  -8.72 203.01 -599.34 278.52
  State-to-state transfers  0.00 105.78 -135.13 497.33
  Federal grants  26.01 47.41 0.00 199.36
  
1994  Gross Domestic Product  20,836 3,208 17,230 34,867
  Net national income  15,631 2,580 12,567 25,823
  Total tax revenue  5,115 2,057 3,412 16,688
  VAT transfer  -114.94 217.31 -1,023.35 119.33
  State-to-state transfers  0.00 71.51 -142.63 389.47
  Federal grants  53.12 183.66 0.00 1,435.81
  
  
Notes: All values in the table are per capita values in constant 1991 Euros. Average values are calculated as averages 
weighted by respective state population. Total tax revenue refers to the sum of federal, state, and local taxes with tax 
incidence within a state’s borders. 
 




Table 2: Basic Statistics, Germany 1995-2006. 
 
  
Year  Variable  Average Std. Dev. Minimum Maximum
  
1995   Gross Domestic Product  19,876 4,661 10,641 34,144
  Net national income  15,018 3,056 8,310 19,471
  Total tax revenue  4,473 2,365 1,143 17,101
  VAT transfer  -19.30 382.58 -1,282.29 713.62
  State-to-state transfers  -5.19 157.65 -163.71 539.72
  Federal grants  127.76 222.21 0.00 1,425.11
  
2000   Gross Domestic Product  21,818 5,185 12,169 37,108
  Net national income  16,123 3,344 8,743 20,723
  Total tax revenue  5,317 2,664 1,420 18,812
  VAT transfer  -55.63 536.61 -1,768.98 880.90
  State-to-state transfers  -7.61 228.42 -402.51 710.22
  Federal grants  130.48 209.40 0.00 1,325.25
  
2006   Gross Domestic Product  23,050 5,350 13,492 38,581
  Net national income  17,400 3,726 9,344 23,410
  Total tax revenue  5,207 2,354 1,540 16,965
  VAT transfer  -48.29 531.84 -2,156.43 845.41
  State-to-state transfers  -6.87 200.62 -326.69 629.58
  Federal grants  130.07 240.65 0.00 670.25
  
 
Notes: All values in the table are per capita values in constant 1991 Euros. Average values are calculated as averages 
weighted by respective state population. Total tax revenue refers to the sum of federal, state, and local taxes with tax 
incidence within a state’s borders. 
 




Table 3: Basic Statistics 1995-2006, East German States. 
 
 
Year  Variable  Average Std. Dev. Minimum Maximum
 
1995  Gross Domestic Product  12,981 3,489 10,641 19,981
  Net national income  9,817 2,274 8,310 14,364
  Total tax revenue  1,933 1,172 1,143 4,277
  VAT transfer  537.42 250.62 42.51 713.62
  State-to-state transfers  228.91 153.93 132.48 539.72
  Federal grants  416.20 31.66 386.92 476.09
 
2000  Gross Domestic Product  14,078 2,833 12,169 19,794
  Net national income  10,243 1,746 8,743 13,714
  Total tax revenue  2,159 1,029 1,420 4,211
  VAT transfer  671.08 308.51 54.47 880.90
  State-to-state transfers  300.30 202.43 183.40 710.22
  Federal grants  427.31 35.23 391.08 493.00
 
2006  Gross Domestic Product  15,087 1,919 13,492 18,726
  Net national income  10,707 1,185 9,344 12,930
  Total tax revenue  2,319 1,104 1,540 4,483
  VAT transfer  600.81 239.02 150.14 845.41
  State-to-state transfers  271.06 181.68 164.24 629.58
  Federal grants  603.08 42.13 532.87 670.25
 
  
Notes: All values in the table are per capita values in constant 1991 Euros. Average values are calculated as averages 
weighted by respective state population. Total tax revenue refers to the sum of federal, state, and local taxes with tax 
incidence within a state’s borders. The sample consists of the 5 East German states and Berlin. 
 




Table 4: Basic Statistics 1995-2006, West German States. 
 
 
Year  Variable  AverageS t d .  D e v . M i n i m u m   Maximum
 
1995  Gross Domestic Product  21,780 2,757 18,551 34,144
  Net national income  16,455 978 13,550 19,471
  Total tax revenue  5,174 2,118 3,428 17,101
  VAT transfer  -173.08 245.34 -1,282.29 100.00
  State-to-state transfers  -69.85 76.50 -163.71 377.35
  Federal grants  48.09 182.80 0.00 1,425.11
 
2000  Gross Domestic Product  23,879 3,421 19,766 37,108
  Net national income  17,689 1,300 15,535 20,723
  Total tax revenue  6,159 2,310 3,688 18,812
  VAT transfer  -249.15 401.50 -1,768.98 253.08
  State-to-state transfers  -89.61 152.26 -402.51 594.66
  Federal grants  51.43 159.63 0.00 1,325.25
 
2006  Gross Domestic Product  25,074 3,840 20,410 38,581
  Net national income  19,101 1,667 16,608 23,410
  Total tax revenue  5,942 1,995 3,904 16,965
  VAT transfer  -213.28 453.78 -2,156.43 311.97
  State-to-state transfers  -77.52 132.14 -326.69 513.78
  Federal grants  9.83 29.17 0.00 242.81
 
 
Notes: All values in the table are per capita values in constant 1991 Euros. Average values are calculated as averages 
weighted by respective state population. Total tax revenue refers to the sum of federal, state, and local taxes with tax 
incidence within a state’s borders. The sample consists of the 10 West German states (excluding Berlin). 
 




Table 5A: Redistribution of state income in Germany, 1970-2006. 
 
Dependent variable
State disposable income after … 1-βd adj. R
2 1-βd adj. R
2
... transfer of federal tax share 0.314 0.98 0.25 0.92
(0.036)*** (0.107)***
+ VAT redistr. among states 0.356 0.98 0.344 0.89
(0.037)*** (0.110)***
+ state-to-state transfers 0.366 0.97 0.36 0.89
(0.040)*** (0.110)***





Notes: * significant at 10%; ** significant at 5%; *** significant at 1%.  
The standard errors in parentheses pertain to βd. Constants are not reported. 1970-1994: 10 observations; 1995-2006:  
16 observations. The regression equation is equation (2) in the text. 
 




Table 5B: Redistribution of state income in Germany, 1995-2006. 
 
Dependent variable
State disposable income after … 1-βd adj. R
2 1-βd adj. R
2
... transfer of federal tax share 0.511 0.91 0.139 0.99
(0.047)*** (0.016)***
+ VAT redistr. among states 0.606 0.80 0.283 0.99
(0.053)*** (0.016)***
+ state-to-state transfers 0.618 0.81 0.232 0.99
(0.053)*** (0.015)***
+ federal grants 0.63 0.77 0.252 0.99
(0.055)*** (0.015)***
West Germany East Germany
1995-2006 1995-2006
 
Notes: * significant at 10%; ** significant at 5%; *** significant at 1%.  
The standard errors in parentheses pertain to βd. Constants are not reported. 1995-2006: 10 obs. (West), 6 obs. (East).
The regression equation is equation (2) in the text.  
 
 
Table 6A: Stabilization of state income in Germany, 1970-2006. 
 
   West Germany  Germany 
Dependent variable  1970-1994 1995-2006 
State disposable income after…  pooled  large †  small  city  adj. R
2 pooled  large  †  small  city adj.  R
2 
                   
... transfer of federal tax share  0.348      0.59  0.081       0.89 
  (0.196)***         (0.081)***         
   -0.098  0.362  0.836  0.81      0.07  -0.012  0.023  0.89 
    (0.041)*** (0.210) (0.107)***        (0.098)***  (0.117) (0.160)   
                   
+ VAT redistr. among states  0.381      0.52  0.159       0.83 
  (0.211)**         (0.120)***         
   -0.11  0.514  0.895  0.76     0.102  0.032  0.079  0.83 
    (0.047)*** (0.307) (0.101)***        (0.121)***  (0.152) (0.225)   
                   
+ state-to-state transfers  0.45     0.43  0.18        0.81 
  (0.227)**         (0.127)***         
   -0.074  0.486  0.968  0.74      0.174  -0.031  0.023  0.81 
    (0.048)*** (0.305) (0.104)***        (0.138)***  (0.164) (0.243)   
                   
+ federal grants  0.467      0.38  0.194       0.74 
  (0.236)**         (0.126)***         
   -0.067  0.46  0.994  0.67      0.167  0.14  -0.017  0.74 
    (0.049)*** (0.310) (0.130)***        (0.136)***  (0.189) (0.232)   
                                
                    
 
Notes: * significant at 10%; ** significant at 5%; *** significant at 1%. The clustered standard errors in parentheses pertain to βs. 1970-1994: 250 observations; 1995-2006: 192 observations. 
The regression equation is equation (3) in the text and a modification where the RHS variable is interacted with dummies for small and city states. 
† In this column, we report the coefficient estimate (1- βs) of the stabilization effect of the fiscal system on state income for a large state, the omitted state size category in the regression. The reported 
coefficient in the small (city) column represents the differential for small (city) states to the stabilization effect in large states (in the large column). For example, the stabilization effect for a small state would 
be the sum of the coefficients in the large and small column.    
 
 
Table 6B: Stabilization of state income in Germany, 1995-2006. With interactive dummies for state size. 
 
 
   West Germany  East Germany 
Dependent variable  1995-2006 1995-2006 
State disposable income after 
… pooled  large  †  small  city  adj.  R
2  pooled  small states ‡  Berlin  adj. R
2 
                    
... transfer of federal tax share  0.162 0.85 0.025 0.96 
  (0.087)***         (0.016)***       
   0.044  -0.014  0.27  0.88      0.053  -0.038  0.96 
   (0.089)***  (0.112)  (0.093)**        (0.064)***  (0.064)   
                    
+ VAT redistr. among states  0.276       0.76  0.099      0.96 
  (0.134)***         (0.014)***       
   0.058  0.036  0.445  0.83      0.119  -0.027  0.96 
    (0.106)*** (0.151) (0.124)***        (0.060)***  (0.060)   
                    
+ state-to-state transfers  0.307       0.73  0.127      0.96 
  (0.137)***         (0.014)***       
    0.124 -0.022 0.418  0.80      0.148  -0.029  0.96 
   (0.121)***  (0.158)  (0.134)**        (0.058)***  (0.058)   
                    
+ federal grants  0.311       0.59  0.141      0.96 
  (0.146)***         (0.014)***       
   0.121  0.199  0.252  0.59      0.161  -0.027  0.96 
   (0.130)***  (0.212)  (0.280)        (0.057)***  (0.057)   
                             
                  
Notes: * significant at 10%; ** significant at 5%; *** significant at 1%. The clustered standard errors in parentheses pertain to  βs. 1995-2006: 120 observations (West); 72 observations (East). 
The regression equation is equation (3) in the text and a modification where the RHS variable is interacted with dummies for small and city states. † In this column, we report the coefficient estimate of the 
stabilization effect (1- βs) of the fiscal system on state income for a large state, the omitted state size category in the regression. The reported coefficient in the small (city) column represents the differential for 
small (city) states to the stabilization effect in large states (in the large column). For example, the stabilization effect for a small state would be the sum of the coefficients in the large and small column. 
‡ This captegory includes all East German states except Berlin.  
 
 
Table 7A: Redistribution of state tax revenue in Germany. 1970-2006. 
 
   West Germany     Germany 
Dependent variable  1970-1994  1995-2006 
State tax revenue after …  1-βd adj.  R
2     1-βd adj.  R
2 
         
... transfer of federal tax share  0.589 0.95   0.407 0.87 
  (0.023)***     (0.083)***  
         
+ VAT redistr. among states  0.74 0.93    0.729  0.80 
  (0.016)***     (0.042)***  
         
+ state-to-state transfers  0.775 0.90   0.774 0.73 
  (0.023)***     (0.039)***  
         
+ federal grants  0.716 0.89   0.783 0.56 
  (0.026)***     (0.069)***  
                 
 
Notes: * significant at 10%; ** significant at 5%; *** significant at 1%. 
The robust standard errors in parentheses pertain to βd. Constants are not reported. 1970-1994: 10 observations; 1995-2006: 16 
observations. The regression equation is equation (2) in the text. 
 




Table 7B: Redistribution of state tax revenue in Germany, 1995-2006. 
 
   West Germany     East Germany 
Dependent variable  1995-2006  1995-2006 
State tax revenue after …  1-βd adj.  R
2     1-βd adj.  R
2 
         
... transfer of federal tax share  0.541 0.94   0.094 0.98 
  (0.021)***     (0.026)***  
         
+ VAT redistr. among states  0.786 0.79   0.759 0.94 
  (0.011)***     (0.013)***  
         
+ state-to-state transfers  0.807 0.75   0.604 0.94 
  (0.012)***     (0.021)***  
         
+ federal grants  0.892 0.60   0.678 0.95 
  (0.014)***     (0.016)***  
                 
         
Notes: * significant at 10%; ** significant at 5%; *** significant at 1%.  
The robust standard errors in parentheses pertain to βd. Constants are not reported. 1995-2006: 10 obs. (West), 6 obs. (East). 




Table 8A: Stabilization of state tax revenue in Germany. 1970-2006. 
 
   West Germany  Germany 
Dependent variable  1970-1994 1995-2006 
State tax revenue after …  pooled  large †  small  city  adj. R




      
... transfer of federal tax share  0.63      0.52  0.397        0.52 
  (0.064)***         (0.056)***        
    0.276 0.121  0.401  0.57      0.23 -0.024  0.214  0.53 
  (0.145)*** (0.160) (0.151)** (0.217)*** (0.250) (0.219)  
                      
+ VAT redistr. among states  0.788       0.32  0.841      0.12 
  (0.031)***         (0.065)**        
  0.6 0.351 0.178 0.34 0.532 0.333 0.338  0.15 
   (0.183)*  (0.183)*  (0.185)        (0.050)***  (0.157)*  (0.075)***   
                      
+ state-to-state transfers  0.962       0.02  0.937      0.03 
  (0.010)***  (0.021)**    
   0.753  0.191  0.221  0.05      0.795  0.094  0.165  0.05 
   (0.099)**  (0.099)*  (0.099)*        (0.053)***  (0.111)  (0.053)***   
                      
+ federal grants  1.026  0.01 0.867   0.11 
  (0.04)**         (0.041)***         
    0.84  0.214 0.192 0.02      0.846 -0.053  0.034  0.11 
   (0.267)  (0.269)  (0.270)        (0.116)  (0.157)  (0.123)   
           
                   
Notes: * significant at 10%; ** significant at 5%; *** significant at 1%. The clustered standard errors in parentheses pertain to βs. 1970-1994: 250 observations; 1995-2006: 192 observations. 
The regression equation is equation (3) in the text and a modification where the RHS variable is interacted with dummies for small and city states. 
† In this column, we report the coefficient estimate of the stabilization effect (1- βs) of the fiscal system on state tax revenue for a large state, the omitted state size category in the regression.  
The reported coefficient in the small (city) column represents the differential for small (city) states to the stabilization effect in large states (in the large column). For example, the stabilization 




Table 8B: Stabilization of state tax revenue in Germany, 1995-2006. 
 
 
   West Germany  East Germany 
Dependent variable  1995-2006 1995-2006 
State tax revenue after …  pooled  large †  small  city  adj. R
2  pooled  small states ‡  Berlin  adj. R
2 
                    
... transfer of federal tax share  0.376       0.60  0.686      0.12 
  (0.068)***         (0.089)**       
   0.2  -0.135  0.228  0.61      0.788  -0.173  0.12 
   (0.225)***  (0.255)  (0.228)        (0.140)  (0.140)   
                    
+ VAT redistr. among states  0.831       0.14  0.921      0.09 
  (0.075)*         (0.022)**       
   0.428  0.362  0.443  0.19      0.933  -0.019  0.07 
    (0.044)*** (0.232) (0.070)***        (0.047)  (0.047)   
                    
+ state-to-state transfers  0.935       0.05  0.947      0.04 
  (0.031)*         (0.010)***       
   0.701  0.125  0.268  0.11      0.944  0.005  0.02 
   (0.083)***  (0.176)  (0.083)**        (0.024)*  (0.024)   
                    
+ federal grants  0.891       0.12  0.692      0.25 
  (0.020)***         (0.111)**       
    0.812 -0.022 0.098  0.13      0.834  -0.242  0.28 
   (0.146)  (0.198)  (0.146)        (0.156)  (0.156)   
                             
                  
Notes: * significant at 10%; ** significant at 5%; *** significant at 1%. The clustered standard errors in parentheses pertain to βs. 1995-2006: 120 observations (West); 72 observations (East). 
The regression equation is equation (3) in the text and a modification where the RHS variable is interacted with dummies for small and city states. 
† In this column, we report the coefficient estimate of the stabilization effect (1- βs) of the fiscal system on state tax revenue for a large state, the omitted state size category in the regression. The reported 
coefficient in the small (city) column represents the differential for small (city) states to the stabilization effect in large states (in the large column). For example, the stabilization effect for a small state would 
be the sum of the coefficients in the large and small column. 




Table 9: Sample States 
 
                  
          
West Germany    East Germany 
        
state   fiscal capacity 
Seats in  
Bundesrat 
 Relative 







            
Baden-Wuerttemberg 2  6  0.69 Berlin  (C)  16  4 1.39 
Bavaria 4  6  0.59 Brandenburg  (S)  10  4 1.85 








Hamburg (C)  3  3  2.10 Saxony  (S)  11  4 1.05 
Hesse   1  5  0.95 Saxony-Anhalt  (S)  12  4 1.76 
Lower Saxony  7  6  0.91 Thuringia  (S) 13  4 1.92 
North Rhine Westphalia  5  6  0.40       
Rhineland-Palatinate (S) 8  4  1.19       
Saarland (S)  9  3  3.32       
Schleswig-Holstein (S)  6  2  1.75       
                   
            
Note: C = city state, S = small state: all other states are classified as large states.  
Fiscal capacity indicates the state's rank in fiscal capacity in 1998 (Source: Spahn, 2000, and Deutscher Bundesrat Website). 
Relative representation indicates the number of seats in the Upper House of parliament (Bundesrat) per state resident normalized by the number of seats relative to the total population. 
Source: Pitlik (2004).   2008
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